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ABSTRACT
Condorcet winning sets are a set-valued generalization of the
well-known concept of a Condorcet winner. As supersets of
Condorcet winning sets are always Condorcet winning sets
themselves, an interesting property of preference profiles is
the size of the smallest Condorcet winning set they admit.
This smallest size is called the Condorcet dimension of a
preference profile. Since little is known about profiles that
have a certain Condorcet dimension, we show in this paper
how the problem of finding a preference profile that has a
given Condorcet dimension can be encoded as a satisfiability
problem and solved by a SAT solver. Initial results include a
minimal example of a preference profile of Condorcet dimen-
sion 3, improving previously known examples both in terms
of the number of agents as well as alternatives. Due to the
high complexity of such problems it remains open whether
a preference profile of Condorcet dimension 4 exists.
1. INTRODUCTION
The contribution of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we pro-
vide a practical implementation for finding a preference pro-
file for a given Condorcet dimension by encoding the prob-
lem as a boolean satisfiability (SAT) problem [2], which is
then solved by a SAT solver. This technique has proven use-
ful for a range of other problems in social choice theory (see,
e.g., [9, 7, 4, 3]) and can easily be adapted. For instance, only
little needs to be altered in order answer similar questions for
dominating sets rather than Condorcet winning sets. Sec-
ondly, we give an answer to an open question by Elkind et al.
[5] and provide a minimal example of a preference profile of
Condorcet dimension 3, which we computed using our im-
plementation. This profile involves 6 alternatives and agents
only, improving the size of previous examples both in terms
of agents and alternatives.1 The formalization in SAT turns
out to be efficient enough, not only to discover this partic-
ular profile of Condorcet dimension 3, but also to show its
minimality.
1For instance, the example in Elkind et al. [5] required 15
alternatives and agents.
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2. PRELIMINARIES
Let A be a set of m alternatives and N = {1, . . . , n} a set
of agents. The preferences of agent i ∈ N are represented
by a linear (i.e., reflexive, complete, transitive, and antisym-
metric) preference relation Ri ⊆ A× A. The interpretation
of (a, b) ∈ Ri, usually denoted by a Ri b, is that agent i
values alternative a at least as much as alternative b. A
preference profile R = (R1, . . . , Rn) is an n-tuple containing
a preference relation Ri for each agent i ∈ N .
Let R be a preference profile. As introduced by Elkind
et al. [5], we now define the notion of a Condorcet win-
ning set through an underlying covering relation between
sets of alternatives and alternatives: A set of alternatives X
θ-covers an alternative y (short: X ≻θR y) if
|{i ∈ N | ∃x ∈ X such that x Ri y}| > θn.
A set of alternatives X is called a Condorcet winning set
if for each alternative y /∈ X the set X 1
2
-covers y. The set
of all Condorcet winning sets of R will be denoted by C(R).
The Condorcet dimension dimC(R) is defined as the size of
the smallest Condorcet winning set the profile R admits, i.e.,
dimC(R) := min{k ∈ N | k = |S| and S ∈ C(R)}.
Example 1. Consider the preference profile R depicted
in Figure 1. As R does not have a Condorcet winner
dimC(R) ≥ 2. It can easily be checked that {a, b} (like any
other two-element set in this case) is a Condorcet winning
set of R and, thus, dimC(R) = 2.
1 1 1
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Figure 1: A preference profile of Condorcet dimension 2.
In this work, we address the computational problem of
finding a preference profile of a given Condorcet dimension.
To this end, we define the problem of checking whether for
a given number of agents n and alternatives m there exists
a preference profile R with dimC(R) = k.
Name: Check-Condorcet-Dimension-k
Instance: A pair of natural numbers n and m.
Question: Does there exist a preference profile R with n
agents and m alternatives that has Condorcet dimension of
at least k?
Preference profiles n = 3 n = 5 n = 6 n = 7 n = 10 n = 15
m = 5 ∼ 1.7 · 106 ∼ 2.5 · 1010 ∼ 3.0 · 1012 ∼ 3.6 · 1014 ∼ 6.2 · 1020 ∼ 1.5 · 1031
m = 6 ∼ 3.7 · 108 ∼ 1.9 · 1014 ∼ 1.4 · 1017 ∼ 1.0 · 1020 ∼ 3.7 · 1028 ∼ 7.2 · 1042
m = 7 ∼ 1.3 · 1011 ∼ 3.3 · 1018 ∼ 1.6 · 1022 ∼ 8.3 · 1025 ∼ 1.1 · 1037 ∼ 3.4 · 1055
m = 10 ∼ 4.8 · 1019 ∼ 6.3 · 1032 ∼ 2.3 · 1039 ∼ 8.3 · 1045 ∼ 4.0 · 1065 ∼ 2.5 · 1098
Table 1: Number of objects involved in the Check-Condorcet-Dimension-3 problem. For k = 3 the subsets of size 2 are
the candidates for Condorcet winning sets.
Note that the following simple observation can be used to
prune the search space in terms of the number of alterna-
tives.
Observation 1. If there is a preference profile R of Con-
dorcet dimension dimC(R) involving m alternatives, then
there is also one of the same dimension involving m + 1
alternatives.
Proof. Let R be a preference profile on a set of m alter-
natives A with dimC(R). We need to construct a preference
profile R′ on a set of m+ 1 alternatives A′ = A ∪ {a′} with
a′ /∈ A such that dimC(R
′) = dimC(R). For each i, define
R′i := Ri ∪ {(x, a
′) | x ∈ A}, i.e., add a′ in the last place of
agent i’s preference ordering. It is then immediately clear
that C(R) ⊆ C(R′), which establishes dimC(R) ≥ dimC(R
′).
On the other hand, if we assume dimC(R) > dimC(R
′),
then there exist a Condorcet winning set S′ for R′ of size
k := |S′| < dimC(R). This set, however, must–by the con-
struction of R′–also be a Condorcet winning set for R; a
contradiction.
3. METHODOLOGY
The number of objects potentially involved in the Check-
Condorcet-Dimension-k problem are given in Table 1 for
k = 3. It is immediately clear that a na¨ıve algorithm will
not solve the problem in a satisfactory manner. This section
describes our algorithmic efforts to solve this problem for
reasonably large instances.
3.1 Translation to propositional logic (SAT)
In order to solve the problem Check-Condorcet-
Dimension-k for arbitrary k ∈ N, we follow a similar ap-
proach as Brandt et al. [4]: we translate the problem to
propositional logic (on a computer) and use state-of-the-art
SAT solvers to find a solution. At a glance, the overall solv-
ing steps are shown in Algorithm 1.
Generally speaking, the problem at hand can be under-
stood as the problem of finding a preference profile that
satisfies certain conditions—here: having a Condorcet di-
mension of at least k). Thus, a satisfying instance of the
propositional formula to be designed should represent a pref-
erence profile. To capture this, a formalization based on two
types of variables suffices. The boolean variable ri,a,b rep-
resents a Ri b, i.e., agent i ranking alternative a at least as
high as alternative b; and the variable cS,y stands for the set
S covering alternative y.
In more detail, the following conditions/axioms need to
be formalized:2
2The further axiom for neutrality is not required for correct-
ness, but speeds up the solving process. It is discussed in
Section 3.2.
Input: positive integers n and m
Output: whether there exists a preference profile R
with n agents and m alternatives and dimC(R) ≥ k
/* Encoding of problem in CNF */
File cnfFile;
foreach agent i do
cnfFile += Encoder.reflexivePreferences(i);
cnfFile += Encoder.completePreferences(i);
cnfFile += Encoder.transitivePreferences(i);
cnfFile += Encoder.antisymmetricPreferences(i);
foreach set S ⊆ A with |S| = k − 1 do
cnfFile += Encoder.noCondorcetWinningSet(S);
/* Symmetry breaking */
cnfFile += Encoder.neutrality();
/* SAT solving */
satisfiable = SATsolver.solve(cnfFile);
if instance is satisfiable then
return true;
else
return false
Algorithm 1: SAT-Check-Condorcet-Dimension-k
1. All n agents have linear orders over the m alternatives
as their preferences (short: linear preferences)
2. For each set S ⊆ A with |S| = k − 1, it is not the case
that S is a Condorcet winning set (short: no Condorcet
set)
For the first axiom, we encode reflexivity, completeness,
transitivity, and anti-symmetry of the relation Ri for all
agents i. The complete translation to CNF (conjunctive
normal form, the established standard input format for SAT
solvers) is given exemplarily for the case of transitivity; the
other axioms are converted analogously.
In formal terms transitivity can be written as
(∀i)(∀x, y, z) (x Ri y ∧ y Ri z → x Ri z)
≡ (∀i)(∀x, y, z) (ri,x,y ∧ ri,y,z → ri,x,z)
≡
∧
i
∧
x,y,z
(¬ (ri,x,y ∧ ri,y,z) ∨ ri,x,z)
≡
∧
i
∧
x,y,z
(¬ri,x,y ∨ ¬ri,y,z ∨ ri,x,z) ,
which then translates to the pseudo code in Algorithm 2 for
generating the CNF file. The key in the translation of the
inherently higher order axioms to propositional logic is (as
pointed out by Geist and Endriss [7] already) that because
of finite domains, all quantifiers can be replaced by finite
conjunctions or disjunctions, respectively.
In all algorithms, a subroutine r(i, x, y) takes care of the
foreach agent i do
foreach alternative x do
foreach alternative y do
foreach alternative z do
variable not(r(i, x, y));
variable not(r(i, y, z));
variable(r(i, x, z));
newClause;
Algorithm 2: Encoding of transitivity of individual pref-
erences
compact enumeration of variables.3
The axiom “no Condorcet set” can be formalized in a sim-
ilar fashion, but requires further subroutines to avoid an
exponential blow-up of the size of the formula in CNF. In
short, the axiom can be written as
(∀S ⊆ A) (|S| = k − 1→ S /∈ C(R))
≡ (∀S ⊆ A)
(
|S| = k − 1→ (∃y /∈ X)S ⊁θR y
)
≡
∧
S⊆A
|S|=k−1
∨
y/∈X
¬cS,y .
It remains as part of this axiom to define a sufficient con-
dition for S ≻θR y. In the following, we denote the small-
est number of agents required for a strict θ-majority by
m(n) := ⌊θk⌋ + 1. In formal terms, we write for each set
S ⊆ A with |S| = k − 1 and each alternative y /∈ X:
S ≻θR y ← ((∃M ⊆ N)|M | = m(n)∧
(∀i ∈M)(∃x ∈ S)x Ri y)
≡ S ≻θR y ∨ ((∀M ⊆ N)|M | = m(n)→
(∃i ∈M)(∀x ∈ S)¬x Ri y)
≡ cS,y ∨

 ∧
M⊆N
|M|=m(n)
∨
i∈M
∧
x∈S
¬ri,x,y

 .
In order to avoid an exponential blow-up when converting
this formula to CNF, variable replacement (a standard pro-
cedure also known as Tseitin transformation) is applied. In
our case, we replaced
∧
x∈S ¬ri,x,y by new variables of the
form hS,y,i and introduced the following defining clauses:
4
∧
S⊆A
|S|=k−1
∧
y∈A
∧
i∈N
(
hS,y,i →
∧
x∈S
¬ri,x,y
)
≡
∧
S⊆A
|S|=k−1
∧
y∈A
∧
i∈N
(
¬hS,y,i ∨
∧
x∈S
¬ri,x,y
)
≡
∧
S⊆A
|S|=k−1
∧
y∈A
∧
i∈N
∧
x∈S
(¬hS,y,i ∨ ¬ri,x,y) .
3The DIMACS CNF format only allows for integer names of
variables. But since we know in advance how many agents
and alternatives there are, we can simply use a standard
enumeration method for tuples of objects.
4Note that one direction of the standard bi-implication suf-
fices here.
In this case, the helper variables even have an intuitive
meaning as hS,y,i enforces that for no alternative x ∈ S it
is the case that agent i prefers alternative y over alternative
x, i.e., agent i does not contribute to S θ-covering y.
Note that the conditions like |S| = k − 1 can easily be
fulfilled during generation of the corresponding CNF formula
on a computer. For enumerating all subsets of alternatives
of a given size we, for instance, used Gosper’s Hack [8].
The corresponding pseudo code for the“no Condorcet set”
axiom can be found in Algorithm 3.
foreach set S ⊆ A with |S| = k − 1 do
foreach alternative y /∈ S do
variable not(c(S, y));
newClause;
/* Definition of variable cS,y */
foreach set M ⊆ N with |M | = m(n) do
variable(c(S, y));
foreach agent i ∈M do
variable(h(S, y, i));
newClause;
/* Definition of auxiliary variable hS,y,i */
foreach agent i ∈ N do
foreach x ∈ S do
variable not(r(i, x, y));
variable not(h(S, y, i));
newClause;
Algorithm 3: Encoding of the axiom “no Condorcet set”
With all axioms formalized in propositional logic, we are
now ready to search for preference profiles R of Condorcet
dimension dimC(R) ≥ k. Before we do so, however, we de-
scribe a (standard) optimization technique called symmetry
breaking, which speeds up the solving process of the SAT
solver.
3.2 Optimized computation
Observe that from a given example of a preference profile
R with dimC(R) ≥ k we can always generate further exam-
ples simply by permuting the (names of the) alternatives.
One could say that all positive witnesses to the SAT-Check-
Condorcet-Dimension-k problem are invariant under per-
mutations of the alternatives. Therefore, we implemented a
standard technique in SAT solving called symmetry break-
ing; here in the form of setting agent 1’s preferences to a
fixed preference ordering, for instance to lexicographic pref-
erences. This trims the search space for the SAT solver and
therefore reduces the runtime of the solving process. An en-
coding can be achieved simply by adding a subformula of
the form ∧
x<y
r(n1, x, y),
which sets the first agents preferences to lexicographic or-
dering.
4. INITIAL RESULTS
All computations were run on a Intel Core i5, 2.66GHz
(quad-core) machine with 12 GB RAM using the SAT solver
plingeling [1].
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Figure 2: A smallest preference profile of Condorcet dimen-
sion 3 (with n = 6 agents m = 6 alternatives).
When called with the parameters n = m = 6, our im-
plementation of SAT-Check-Condorcet-Dimension-k re-
turns the preference profile Rdim3 within about one second.
Rdim3 is a smallest preference profile of Condorcet dimension
3 and is shown in Figure 2.5
Furthermore, it turns out that this preference profile is
a smallest profile of Condorcet dimension 3. All strictly
smaller profiles (i.e., with less agents and at most as many
alternatives, or with less alternatives and at most as many
agents) can be shown to have a Condorcet dimension of at
most 2 via SAT-Check-Condorcet-Dimension-3.6
An overview of further (preliminary) results can be found
in Table 2.
Model (decoding of satisfying assignment) found:
Agent 0: 0 > 1 > 2 > 3 > 4 > 5
Agent 1: 2 > 3 > 5 > 0 > 4 > 1
Agent 2: 5 > 4 > 0 > 1 > 2 > 3
Agent 3: 3 > 5 > 1 > 4 > 0 > 2
Agent 4: 4 > 0 > 3 > 1 > 2 > 5
Agent 5: 1 > 2 > 4 > 3 > 5 > 0
does not have a Condorcet winning set of size 2
(6 agents and 6 alternatives).
Witnesses:
{0, 1} does not cover alternative(s): 5
{0, 2} does not cover alternative(s): 4
{1, 2} does not cover alternative(s): 0
{0, 3} does not cover alternative(s): 4
{1, 3} does not cover alternative(s): 0
{2, 3} does not cover alternative(s): 0
{0, 4} does not cover alternative(s): 5
{1, 4} does not cover alternative(s): 5
{2, 4} does not cover alternative(s): 1
{3, 4} does not cover alternative(s): 2
{0, 5} does not cover alternative(s): 3
{1, 5} does not cover alternative(s): 3
{2, 5} does not cover alternative(s): 1
{3, 5} does not cover alternative(s): 2
{4, 5} does not cover alternative(s): 3
Figure 3: Output of SAT-Check-Condorcet-Dimension-
3 for n = 6 agents and m = 6 alternatives.
5The witnesses for all sets S ⊆ A with |S| = 2 not being
Condorcet winning sets are also returned by SAT-Check-
Condorcet-Dimension-3 and can be obtained from the
output in Figure 3. That there is a larger set (e.g., {a, b, c})
which forms a Condorcet winning set can easily be con-
firmed manually (or by calling SAT-Check-Condorcet-
Dimension-4).
6The running time to check all cases again is only a few
seconds.
m\n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 – – – – – – – – – – – –
2 – – – – – – – – – – – –
3 – – – – – – – – – – – –
4 – – – – – – – – – – – –
5 – – – – – – – – – – – –
6 – – – – – + – – – – +
7 – – – – – + – – + +
8 – – – – + + +
9 – – – + + +
10 – – – + + +
Table 2: Preliminary collection of results obtained with
SAT-Check-Condorcet-Dimension-3 for different num-
bers of alternatives m and voters n. A plus (+) stands for
a preference profile found; a minus (–) for the fact that all
preference profiles have a Condorcet winning set of size 2.
5. OUTLOOK AND FUTURE WORK
Our implementation might be useful to find preference
profiles of Condorcet dimension 4, a problem that has been
raised by Elkind et al. [5]. Even though with the current
formalization the solving process did not terminate within a
reasonable amount of time, we intend to further pursue this
direction in future work. Adding further symmetry break-
ing clauses (which make use of anonymity in addition to
neutrality) could be a first step in this direction.
Furthermore, one could extend the notion of Condorcet
dimension to other individual preferences, e.g., with agents
having weak (i.e., ties are allowed) or even incomplete pref-
erences. Because of the high flexibility of our SAT formal-
ization, one can easily apply the same method to analyze
these related concepts and questions.7
A formalization with other solving techniques, e.g., ASP
[6], might be another way to achieve the desired perfor-
mance.
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